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Searching for the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights: 
The Neglected Role of ‘Democratic Society’ 
 
1. Introduction 
When one examines the current place of democracy in the political discourse surrounding the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter, the Court), one is struck by how drastically it has 
changed since the Court’s early days. Legal historians are clear that democracy played a 
significant role in supporting the creation of the Convention nascent system: early civil 
society activists and politicians aimed to install an intergovernmental ‘alarm bell’1 system 
against the return of totalitarian practices while drafting states aimed to ‘lock up’2 the 
democratic process against internal opponents. Article 2 of the first draft of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (hereafter, the Convention) prepared by the European 
Movement in 1948 (before it reached the legislative and executive levels of the Council of 
Europe (hereafter, the CoE)) required each state party ‘faithfully to respect the fundamental 
principles of democracy’ and to proscribe any action ‘which would interfere with the right of 
political criticism and the right to organise a political opposition’.3 In schematic terms, the 
preservation of democracy was the end and the Convention ‘system’ the means. 
 
Today, the political discourse has significantly changed. In a number of state parties 
(including early promoters of the Court’s system such as the United Kingdom4), democracy is 
increasingly employed as a normative standpoint to criticize the Court’s adjudication. On this 
view, the Court has excessively extended its role of final interpreter of the Convention (based 
on Article 32 ECHR). This has led not only politicians but also academics and national judges 
to question the legitimacy of the Court’s authority. A senior judge of the United Kingdom 
even questioned the very existence of the Court: ‘if one accepts, as I have so far argued, that 
                                                 
1
 For the non-governmental group the ‘European Movement’, which initially formed the project of an 
international convention in July 1949 in the Hague, the main goal was ‘the creation among the European 
democracies of a system of collective security against tyranny and oppression’ and that ‘without delay, joint 
measures should be taken to halt the spread of totalitarianism and maintain an area of freedom’. In European 
Movement and the Council of Europe (Hutchinson, 1949). The limited purpose of the ‘alarm bell’ system would 
therefore explain the quasi-judicial character of the Court, which lasted until the introduction of Protocol 11 in 
1949. As to the Court more specifically, Bates explains that ‘it would be the conscience of the free Europe, 
acting like an ‘alarm bell’ warning the other nations of democratic Europe that one of their number was going 
‘totalitarian’. At this stage, then, the human rights guarantee was minimalist in its ambition’. Ed Bates, ‘The 
Birth of the European Convention on Human Rights’, in Jonas Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen (eds.), 
The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2011), 21. 
2
 In his seminal article, Moravcsik argues that neither realism nor idealism explains the state’s acceptance of the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction and the right to individual petition, which ‘constrain its domestic sovereignty in 
such an unprecedentedly invasive and overtly non-majoritarian manner’. Rather, the explanation lies in the 
state's tactic to consolidate democratic institutions vis-à-vis internal political opponents in times of uncertainty: 
‘sovereignty costs are weighted against establishing human rights regimes, whereas greater political stability 
may be weighted in favour of it’.  In Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe,’ International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000): 220–221. 
3
 Bates, ‘The Birth of the European Convention on Human Rights,’ 39. 
4
 Most recently, Prime Minister David Cameron included in his agenda for EU reform the following objective: 
UK police forces and justice systems should be ‘able to protect British citizens, unencumbered by unnecessary 
interference from the European institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights’. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/16/david-cameron-eu-reform (accessed January 15, 2015). On the 
issue of the prisoners’ right to vote, Cameron held in 2009 that ‘it makes me physically ill to even contemplate 
having to give the right to anyone who is in prison (…)’. Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjzmvvozHuw (accessed January 15, 2015).  
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human rights are universal in abstraction but national in application, it is not easy to see how 
in principle an international court was going to perform this function of deciding individual 
cases, still less why the Strasbourg court was thought a suitable body to do so’.5 In parallel to 
the political discourse, legal scholars have articulated sophisticated arguments that question 
the Court’s supreme interpretive role either in function or in content. For example, some 
argue that the Court fails to regard the on-going ‘democratic’ discussion of the content and 
limits of those rights in domestic legal orders (generated by the subsidiary role of the Court) 
when the Court adopts a teleological approach to adjudication, that is, when it defines for 
itself the telos of the Convention, As Wheatley puts it, ‘the political culture of the democratic 
States, i.e. the way in which political debate is conducted within democratic society, is not 
sympathetic to any claim to ‘know better’ by an actor or institution on issues of social, 
economic and political controversy, i.e. where there is disagreement (…)’.6 The range of self-
created interpretive doctrines (‘living instrument’, ‘evolutive and dynamic’; ‘autonomous 
concepts’ or even ‘practical and effective’), which extend the Court’s judicial powers far 
beyond what drafting states could possibly have envisioned, is thereby concerned.7   
 
In this article, I argue that the role of the Court amounts to reinforcing the same democratic-
procedural standards by which its critics assess the Court’s performance. The basis of my 
counter-critique is empirical: while the current literature employs democracy as an 
independent normative standpoint to assess the Court’s practice, it often fails to locate and 
reconstruct the place and the role of democracy in the reasoning of the Court. True, how 
democracy operates within this judicial context and what kind of reason it gives – to justify, to 
enlarge or to restrict the scope of the Convention rights – is not clear from the text of the 
Convention. Although it is included the Preamble, democracy is only found in the restriction 
clauses of the qualified rights of the Convention (Articles 8-11). More precisely, ‘democratic 
society’ stands prominently at the final stage of what has been called the ‘fair balance test’8 
when the Court finally balances the alleged interference with the Convention right(s) against 
the justification given by the respondent state party9 – verifying that the authorities ‘struck a 
fair balance’ between the right and some collective interest. Even a quick look at the case law 
                                                 
5
 Lord Hoffmann, ‘The universality of human rights’, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, 19 March 2009. 
Available at: http://www.judiciary.govuk/2009-4/speech-lord-hoffman-19032009.html (accessed October 15 
2014). 
6
 Steven Wheatley, ‘On the Legitimate Authority of International Human Rights Bodies,’ in The Legitimacy of 
International Human Rights Regimes, ed. Andreas Follesdal, Johan Karlsson. Schaffer, and Geir Ulfstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 103. 
7
 The group of legal experts mandated by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (CoE) to 
examine the Convention’s proposal (in 1949) claimed in their advisory opinion that ‘the jurisprudence of a 
European Court will never, therefore, introduce any new element or one contrary to existing international law’. 
Cited in Bates, ‘The Birth of the European Convention on Human Rights,’ 39. 
8
 For a still-to-date overview, see A. Mowbray, ‘A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights,’ Human Rights Law Review 10, no. 2 (2010): 289–317. 
9
 This is also where the Court may allocate a margin of appreciation to the respondent state party. Yutaka Arai-
Takahashi, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Theoretical Analysis of Strasbourg’s Variable Geometry,’ 
in Andreas Follesdal, Birgit Peters, and Geir Ulfstein (eds.), Constituting Europe: The European Court of 
Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 62. 
The margin of appreciation doctrine is not explicit in the Convention (or in the preparatory works). The doctrine 
is conceived as justifying the limits of the Court’s interpretive authority on national courts. It is a  jurisprudential 
creation that dates back to the need for acceptability of the Court’s authority vis-à-vis the state parties. As Arai-
Takahashi explains, ‘since the inception, this consideration has impacted upon the judicial policy of the 
Strasbourg organs (the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, or the Court) and the erstwhile European 
Commission of Human Rights) in mitigating ‘damaging confrontations’  between them and the member states by 
allocating ‘spheres of authority’’. In Ibid, 63. 
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on those qualified rights shows that democracy and more particularly the notion of 
‘democratic society’ plays a justificatory role in the Court’s resolution of cases.  
 
Regrettably, however, the systematic and normative reconstruction of the Court’s ‘democratic 
society’ has been rather neglected in the recent literature on the legitimacy of the Court’s 
authority.10 This article remedies this deficit and shows that the Court relies on a normative 
conception of ‘democratic society’ to justify its judicial authority vis-à-vis the respondent 
state party. Two caveats must be mentioned form the onset, however. The first is that the 
argument centers on the qualified rights of the Convention where the normative role of 
‘democratic society’ is most salient (Articles 8—11). This is an important limit to the 
argument. While the notion now extends to other rights of the Convention11, it does not 
necessarily play the same normative role in the finding of the violation. The second is that I 
do not extract the Court’s conception of ‘democratic society’ from explicit and principled 
statements of the Court. Rather, I adopt an inductive method and identify the contours of this 
conception by successively examining how ‘democratic society’ governs the scope of Article 
10 (expression), Article 11 (assembly and association) and Article 3 (Protocol 1) (free 
elections). The need for a right-based approach is also due to the ad hoc character of the 
Court’s review process (each case examined ‘on its merits’).  
 
There are three specific steps in the argument. In section 2 of the article, I shed light on the 
crucial role that ‘pluralism’ plays in substantively defining the Court’s ‘democratic society’. 
There is of course the Preamble’s passage to which the Court systematically refers to justify 
the wide scope of Article 10 (expression) and Article 11 (reunion and association): ‘such are 
the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 
‘democratic society’’.12 But what matters more is how the Court has extracted the normative 
role of pluralism from that founding passage to justify the extended scope of the ‘political’ 
rights of the ECHR; on freedom of expression, most prominently, the Court routinely relies 
on pluralism to impose a positive duty on state parties that extends ‘not only to ‘information’ 
or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb’ find a place in the public arena’.13 
The adversarial character of public debates is routinely required by Strasbourg’s ‘democratic 
society’ and culminates in the formal recognition of a ‘right of the public to be informed of 
various perspectives’ on an issue of public interest, as I shall explain.  
 
The second step of my argument in section 3 of the article is to make normative sense of the 
Court's proposition that pluralism fosters ‘democratic society’. I argue that the Court’s 
emphasis finds support in the so-called ‘egalitarian’ argument for democracy championed by 
                                                 
10
 This is not to say that human rights theorists have not suggested how human rights and democracy connect in 
moral and abstract terms. Rather, what is missing is a specific assessment of the Court’s ‘democratic society’ on 
the basis of normative theory. See e.g. in particular Samantha Besson, ‘Human rights and democracy in a global 
context: decoupling and recoupling’, Ethics & Global Politics 4, no.1 ( 2011). See also Rainer Forst, ‘The 
Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive Approach,’ Ethics 120, no. 4 
(2010): 711–40. 
11
 As De Schutter and Tulkens report, ‘the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has extended this 
approach to certain rights and freedoms whose formulation in the Convention does not follow this two-tiered 
structure, progressively developing what may be called a general theory of restrictions to the guarantees of the 
European Convention of Human Rights’. In Olivier De Schutter and Françoise Tulkens, ‘Rights in Conflicts: 
The European Court of Human Rights as a Pragmatic Institution’, in Eva Brems (ed.), Conflicts Between 
Fundamental Rights (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2008), 200. 
12
 Handyside v United Kingdom, App no 5493/72 (ECHR, 7 December 1976), at para 50. 
13
 Ibid. 
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Thomas Christiano. The driving thought is that members of a political community have more 
reasons to accept the outcome of the democratic procedure if they were recognized as ‘public 
equals’ – that is, if they were allowed to express their views (however divisive) and to 
persuade others. The wide scope of freedom of expression serves this legitimatory function. 
Surely, adopting this account would require discussing other conceptions of democracy in 
political theory. My objective is here limited to show that the Court’s adjudication is 
responsive to a particular democratic ethos, not to demonstrate if and how that particular ethos 
can defeat its rivals in political theory.14 It must also be noted that Christiano takes his 
argument to justify judicial review.15 I then return to the reasoning of the Court to show how 
this interpretation can further illuminate the Court’s reasoning on other qualified rights. Not 
just expression but also peaceful assembly and association (Article 11) as well as the right to 
free elections (Article 3 (Protocol 1)) are all justified upon the search for public equality in 
conditions of deep pluralism. Once those rights and their duties are envisioned as a whole, it 
appears that the Court justifies its interpretive authority on distinctively democratic grounds 
(procedural and substantive), which offers a fundamental response to its critics. As a result, 
rather than interfering with the democratic process within state parties, the Court reinforces 
and consolidates it.  
 
Finally, I discuss in section 5 possible objections to the argument. Democratic theorists have 
for long argued that domestic judicial review does not and cannot respect the 
representativeness that is required from democratic institutions.16 Interestingly, the argument 
was recently re-activated – under a modified form – in the context of the Court and 
international human rights bodies (hereafter, IHRBs) more generally. While accepting in 
principle the function of judicial review, Steven Wheatley objects that Strasbourg’s 
interpretive methodology does not incorporate the democratic specification of human rights 
norms that has been developing within the state parties.17 Alternatively, Richard Bellamy 
examines in a recent article the Court’s authority through the lens of his political 
constitutionalist framework and concludes that the Court’s legitimate role should be confined 
to a weak form of review.18 If the scope of those two arguments differs, both accounts fail to 
                                                 
14
 See in particular the critique of the application of Christiano’s argument to judicial review by Corey 
Brettschneider, ‘Judicial Review and Democratic Authority: Absolute v. Balancing Conceptions’, Journal of 
Ethics and Social Philosophy 5, no.3 (2011), available at http://www.jesp.org/symposia.php  (Accessed January 
15, 2015). 
15
 As Christiano puts it in a reply to his critics, ‘I argue that under the right conditions a system of judicial 
review of legislation that empowers the judiciary to strike down legislation that violates public equality can be 
legitimate. This is because a decision of the democratic assembly that violates public equality has no value, so a 
court that strikes it down will at least have the value that it preserves public equality’. In Thomas Christiano, 
‘Reply to Critics of the Constitution of Equality, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5, no.3 (2011), 
available at http://www.jesp.org/symposia.php (Accessed January 15, 2015). 
16
 The domestic critique can take a radical form. In a seminal article, Jeremy Waldron contends that installing a 
(supranational) court with the final word over the content and scope of abstract rights ‘inherently and necessarily 
does an injustice, in its operation, to the participatory aspirations of the ordinary citizen’. See Jeremy Waldron, 
‘A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights,’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13, no. 1 (1993): 18–51. See 
also Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review,’ The Yale Law Journal 
115, no. 6 (2006): 1346–1406. In the words of Christopher Zurn, Waldron ‘seems to regard most forms of extra-
legislative governmental power as regrettable reflections of an anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic bias against 
ordinary citizens’. See Christopher F. Zurn, Deliberative Democracy and the Institutions of Judicial Review 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 145. 
17
 Wheatley, ‘On the Legitimate Authority of International Human Rights Bodies.’ 
18
 Richard Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions: Political 
Constitutionalism and the European Convention on Human Rights,’ European Journal of International Law 25, 
no. 4 (2014): 1019–42. 
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systematically examine the structure and content of the Court’s reasoning and differentiate 
between rights and between the duties correlative to those rights. My legal-empirical inquiry 
reveals, as far as Articles 8-11 are concerned, that the Court justifies its interpretive authority 
by asserting the same basic normative criteria of democratic legitimacy – e.g. the need to 
address the interests of all subjects in the democratic procedure – that those authors employ to 
examine the Court’s authority.  
 
In this final section, I also contrast my argument with George Letsas’ ‘moral reading’ 
argument according to which the very purpose of human rights adjudication is ‘is to discover, 
over time and through persuasive moral argument, the moral truth about these fundamental 
rights’.19 My inquiry importantly nuances this view. That the Court engages with moral 
reasoning and dismisses positivist doctrines of adjudication (e.g. literalism, originalism, 
intentionalism, consensualism, etc.) strikes me as largely correct. That the Court is searching 
and discovering the moral truths of those rights – an argument reminiscent of realism in moral 
theory – is quite another thing. This part of argument requires showing that the Court’s 
findings are not only moral-deontological in kind but that the Court reports in its judgments 
what it takes to be independent moral facts. However, the deontological nature of the Court’s 
statements does not necessarily imply that those statements are viewed as moral truths (based 
on the sole text of the judgments). Judges could agree on the premise of public equality while 
diverging about the ultimate moral foundations of that status. My inquiry rather suggests that 
the Court’s adjudication amounts to identifying the duties and duty-bearers that serve the 
realization of this basic equality in the conditions of deep pluralism.  
2. Reconstructing the Court’s ‘democratic society’ 
The first premise to my argument is the governing role that the notion of ‘democratic society’ 
plays in the Court’s ad hoc resolution of cases. It is therefore necessary to carefully locate, in 
descriptive terms, where the notion operates in the formal structure of the review. When the 
Court reviews whether a piece of domestic legislation conforms to the Convention, it can find 
an interference with one or more rights only on the basis of the facts of the case presented by 
the applicant and examined in light of a set of established interpretive principles. Yet the 
interference does not amount to a violation if the respondent state party can justify its 
interference via the restriction clauses, which are almost identical for all the qualified rights 
(Articles 8—11) of the Convention (‘publicity’, ‘legitimate aim’, ‘democratic necessity’). The 
Court thereby switches the burden of proof to the state party. As Gerards and Senden explain, 
‘a definitive conclusion about the alleged violation can be reached only when the soundness 
of the justification adduced by the government has been scrutinized’.20 
It is widely agreed that the Court has spilled much more ink on this last step (‘democratic 
necessity’) than on the two others (‘accessibility of the law’21 and ‘legitimate aim’22) and 
                                                 
19
 George Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer,’ The European Journal 
of International Law 21, no. 3 (2010): 540. 
20
 Janneke Gerards and Hanneke Senden, ‘The Structure of Fundamental Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights,’ International Journal of Constitutional Law 7, no. 4 (2009): 623. 
21
 At this stage, the Court reviews whether the legal norm was accessible to the individual. This mostly implies 
that the law must be published. The Court also reviews whether the legal norm is formulated with the precision 
as to its meaning and scope – the foreseeability of the law.  
22
 At this stage of the test, the Court reviews whether the interference pursued a ‘legitimate aim’ – as specified 
in the second paragraph of Articles 8-11: the protection of public safety, public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others, etc.). This standard is ambiguous. Its wording suggests that it 
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sometimes even conflates the first two with the third. While ‘legitimate aim’ is treated by the 
Court as an exercise of classification without much discussion, it takes ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ as forming the central step of the test. As Arai-Takahashi confirms, ‘the 
Strasbourg organ may prefer to focus their scrutiny on the third standard, finding it 
unnecessary to ascertain compliance with the first and second standard’.23 It goes without 
saying that the formulation is ambiguous: not only is ‘democratic society’ undefined in the 
Convention, but it is also silent on which normative standards make the violation necessary 
(the standards of proportionality stricto sensu) in that society. In fact, rather than directly 
specifying what those standards are, the Court has engaged in defining what it takes to be the 
essential conditions of a ‘democratic society’ and then has articulated how each of the 
qualified rights (the interest(s) they protect, the duties and duty-bearers they entail) serves that 
society. Consequently, the interpretation of this notion is another occasion – in addition to the 
interpretation of the rights’ wording – to specify what those rights ultimately are about, and 
more importantly, how specifically each relates to democracy.  
Most importantly, the Court binds ‘democratic society’ to a normative notion of pluralism. 
While pluralism certainly does not exhaust ‘democratic society’ in the Court’s eyes, it is often 
located at the end of the Court’s justificatory reasoning when it favors the right(s) over the 
respondent state party. This is particularly the case of the right to freedom of expression 
(Article 10). The Court long ago established the inherent link between expression and 
democracy. In the seminal Handyside v. United Kingdom, which pertained to the publication 
of the Little Red School Book (encouraging young people to reflect on societal norms 
including sex and drugs), the Court held that ‘freedom of expression constitutes one of the 
essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the 
development of every man (…)’.24 Yet the Court has not subsequently specified how 
expressing a view in public furthers self-development. Rather, it has emphasized how the 
expression of pluralistic views benefits a democratic society as a whole. Since the same 
Handyside v. United Kingdom, the Court routinely relies on the Preamble’s widely cited 
passage that ‘such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without 
which there is no ‘democratic society’’ 25 to support this emphasis.   
It must be clear that the Court’s emphasis on pluralism goes well beyond a mere factual 
recognition of diversity and disagreement in public debate: the Court firmly holds that 
pluralism serves ‘democratic society’. This is seen in how pluralism generates a salient 
positive duty requiring states to guarantee access ‘not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those 
that offend, shock or disturb’ find a place in the public arena’.26 This sentence has become the 
Court’s lingua franca on freedom of expression when it justifies the place of extremist 
political views, insults to heads of states, satire or just exaggeration in public debate. The 
thought is that the Court does not just allow individuals to make their claim in the public 
arena, however ‘unpalatable’ they are. It also suggests that pluralism and contradiction are 
necessary to a ‘democratic society’ and thereby should govern the scope of freedom of 
expression. Let us take the case of extremist political views. In Gündüz v. Turkey, which 
                                                                                                                                                        
incorporates a justificatory dimension. However, the Court treats it as an exercise of classification and tends to 
turn to evaluation only at (or just conflates the stage with the last stage) the stage of ‘democratic necessity’. 
23
 Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2002), 9. 
24
 Handyside v United Kingdom, at para 49. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
 7 
 
concerned the leader of an Islamic sect defending sharia law on an independent Turkish 
television channel, the Court famously held that while Sharia law is incompatible with a 
democratic society (it ‘clearly diverged from Convention values’27), publicly defending its 
implementation cannot be subject to restriction under the ‘democratic necessity’ clause. The 
standard against which the case is measured, which in turn determines the margin of 
appreciation, is precisely whether the views expressed by the claimant were counterbalanced 
in the public arena:  
‘the applicant's extremist views were already known and had been discussed in the 
public arena and, in particular, were counterbalanced by the intervention of the 
other participants in the programme; and lastly, they were expressed in the course 
of a pluralistic debate in which the applicant was actively taking part. 
Accordingly, the Court considers that in the instant case the need for the 
restriction in issue has not been established convincingly’.28 
As in the case of separatist views29, the Court suggests that the most divisive views ought to 
be equally entitled to be expressed within an on-going public debate and counter-balanced 
with contradictory views. The same is true, for instance, in Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 
which pertained to the publication of a press article depicting the career of Marshal Pétain in a 
positive fashion and that the French courts condemned. However, the Court found a violation 
of Article 10 arguing that ‘that forms part of the efforts that every country must make to 
debate its own history openly and dispassionately’.30 Several questions emerge from this 
reading of the Court’s reasoning: is pluralism compelling because it allows individuals to find 
some form of consensus on issues on which they initially disagreed? Or is pluralism desirable 
because it allows publicly held views to go through the Millian process of ‘trial and error’ in 
the search for improved beliefs? I address those issues in the next section of the article.   
More importantly at this point: does the Court’s attachment to pluralism apply to all views 
held in public? The Court faces this question, for instance, when it balances freedom of 
expression against the right to reputation under Article 8 (privacy). In the recent Von 
Hannover v. Germany, which concerned the publication the pictures of the private life of 
Princess Caroline of Monaco, the Court made explicit that pluralism is particularly important 
when a public interest is at stake. If that interest is not found, state parties enjoy a margin of 
appreciation. The Court circumscribes the domain of ‘public interest’ very clearly:  
‘The Court considers that a fundamental distinction needs to be made between 
reporting facts – even controversial ones – capable of contributing to a debate in a 
democratic society relating to politicians in the exercise of their functions, for 
example, and reporting details of the private life of an individual who, moreover, 
as in this case, does not exercise official functions. While in the former case the 
press exercises its vital role of ‘watchdog’ in a democracy by contributing to 
                                                 
27
 Gündüz v Turkey, App. No. 35071/97 (ECHR, 4 December 2003), at para 51. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 In Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria, the Court held that ‘demanding 
territorial changes in speeches and demonstrations does not automatically amount to a threat to the country’s 
territorial integrity and national security (…)’. In Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v 
Bulgaria Apps. no 29221/95, 29225/95 (ECtHR, 2 October 2001), at para 97. 
30
 Lehideux and Isorni v France, App. No. 24662/94 (ECtHR, 23 September 1998), at para 51. 
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‘impart[ing] information and ideas on matters of public interest (…), it does not 
do so in the latter case’’.31 
The suggestion here is that the margin of appreciation correlates to the degree to which some 
publicly held view contributes to an on-going, plural and adversarial debate of public interest. 
When it applies the ‘democratic necessity’ clause, the Court systematically conducts such an 
assessment. In the recent case of Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, in which the applicant heavily 
criticized the institution of the Spanish monarchy, the Court confirmed that ‘there is little 
scope under Article 10 § 2 for restrictions on freedom of expression in the area of political 
speech or debate – where freedom of expression is of the utmost importance – or in matters of 
public interest’.32 Most recently, in Pentikäinen v. Finland, which pertained to the arrest of a 
photographer in demonstrations surrounding an Asia-Europe meeting in Helsinki, the Court 
judged the facts against the same standard: ‘the Court considers that the demonstration was a 
matter of legitimate public interest, having regard in particular to its nature. From the point of 
view of the general public’s right to receive information about matters of public interest, and 
thus from the standpoint of the press, there were justified grounds for reporting the event to 
the public’.33 
The Court’s emphasis on pluralism culminates in the formal recognition that the larger public 
has a ‘right to be informed’ on issues of public interest. The right to be informed is clearly not 
confined to just hearing about a recent public issue. Here again, the Court suggests that 
‘democratic society’ requires people to receive plural and contradictory perspectives on those 
issues. This right was initially claimed in Erdoğdu and İnce v. Turkey, which pertained to the 
interview of a sociologist on the conflict in Kurdistan; the Court held that ‘domestic 
authorities in the instant case failed to have sufficient regard to the public’s right to be 
informed of a different perspective on the situation in south-east Turkey, irrespective of how 
unpalatable that perspective may be for them’.34 A recent instance of this reasoning is found 
in Çamyar and Berktaş v. Turkey, where the Court examined the content of a book that 
severely criticizes the Turkish penitentiary system.35Now, despite those notable efforts in 
conceptual exploration, the Court has not precisely explained why pluralism matters in a 
democracy. While holding normative statements about the proper nature of a ‘democratic 
society’, the Court has not established what exactly justifies the broad range of duties derived 
from such notion or why those duties outweigh other rights and duties protected by the 
Convention in case of conflict. This is where, I believe, one needs to engage with normative 
democratic theory.   
3. Pluralism in the egalitarian argument for democracy 
Having delineated the contours of the Court’s ‘democratic society’ and the prominent role of 
pluralism in substantively defining that society, the second step of my argument is to make 
normative sense of this predominant reasoning through normative democratic theory and 
more specifically the egalitarian argument for democracy. The limited scope of the paper does 
not allow me to retrieve all the steps of this argument, of course. I rather want to focus on the 
crucial role that pluralism plays in it, and how it can illuminate the Court’s specification of its 
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‘democratic society’ delineated above. Indeed, egalitarian democrats not only assume that 
there are deep conflicts exist about how to define the terms of association in a political 
community. They also argue that democracy can best advance the equality of subjects in the 
making of those terms. As Christiano puts it, ‘democratic decision-making is the unique way 
to publicly embody equality in collective decision-making under the circumstances of 
pervasive conscientious disagreement in which we find ourselves’.36   
In his path-breaking book, Thomas Christiano firmly insists on the facts of diversity, 
disagreement, cognitive bias and fallibility as pervading collective deliberations on issues of 
public interest. Those facts constitute a serious challenge to the realization of political 
equality. The effect of cognitive bias, for instance, is that a person’s ‘ideas about the good life 
and even justice tend to reflect her own background, distinctive experiences, and talents’.37 
The risk is that this person’s judgment about the common good unilaterally applied to all is 
likely to fail to take into account the interests of others. Further, egalitarian democrats assume 
that such conflicts cannot be solved by rational persuasion on terms that will be acceptable to 
all, which marks the distinction with a range of views in deliberative democracy attached to 
reaching an overlapping consensus or a compromise. For Christiano, in contrast, the cost of 
attempting to find consensus or a compromise may be too high and could be unequally 
distributed among deliberators.38 
Of course, the egalitarian justification of democracy cannot just rely on factual considerations 
pertaining to pluralism and disagreement in collective deliberation. Any account of 
democracy relies on a deontological premise about the fundamental equality of individuals. 
Christiano, for instance, relies on a concept of persons as ‘authorities in the domain of values’ 
to express that concern.39 However, which rights should be exercised to foster this basic 
equality in practice, and to what extent, is highly contentious. In contrast to other accounts, 
the egalitarian argument attempts to answer those vexing questions – including by suggesting 
how to resolve conflicts of rights – in a way that maximizes the equal advancement individual 
interests. As Christiano explains, ‘the principle invites us to think about how all the rights, 
duties, roles, and special relationships fit together in in an overall institutional scheme so that 
people’s interests are advanced in such a way that they are advanced equally’.40 The limits 
adduced to the rights should be viewed through the tension between pluralism qua fact and 
the principle of public equality qua norm.  
 
This is precisely where the right to freedom of expression gains prominence. Allowing 
individuals to widely express their (divisive) views not only ensures that their interests are 
equally taken into consideration publicly. On the one hand, it serves the interest of speakers in 
that ‘the protection of the right to freedom expression also advances the interests of each 
person in being recognized and affirmed as an equal in society’.41 On the other hand, given 
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their cognitive bias, it serves the interest of listeners in that ‘a person can learn just about just 
as much by having his ideas expressed by others and responded to as he can by expressing his 
ideas himself’.42 If one advances a view regardless of what others think, then she does not 
treat others as equals in the context of deep pluralism. On those two counts, therefore, a wide 
scope helps (‘instrumentally just’43 in Christiano’s terms). This account also impacts on the 
legitimacy of the outcome of the democratic procedure. If one ends up vastly disagreeing with 
the outcome, the fact that one was allowed to make her claims in public and persuade others 
gives one content-independent reasons to accept the outcome: ‘the thought is that when an 
outcome is democratically chosen and some people disagree with the outcome, as some 
inevitably will, they still have a duty to go along with the decision because otherwise they 
would be treating the others unfairly’.44 
 
Finally, the principle of public equality can help resolving conflicts of rights. For Christiano, 
the two interests to a conflict should be viewed through their contribution to public equality. 
In the classical case of blasphemy for instance, the blasphemer’s right to express his view 
publicly and convince others prevails against the harm caused by the act of blasphemy: ‘to 
ban blasphemy would amount to setting back the interests of the alleged blasphemer so that 
another’s interests in having his desire that everyone conform their behavior and speech to his 
opinions be respected’.45 Not only should the blasphemer be allowed to express his view. The 
opponent to blasphemy can also try to persuade the blasphemer to stop so that both interests 
are equally and publicly advanced. In the next section of the article, I show how this rationale 
can apply to the Court’s resolution of the conflict between the freedom of expression (Article 
10) and the right to reputation (under Article 8). 
 
This overview of the egalitarian defense of democracy should not obscure other conditions 
that Christiano takes to be central to realize public equality such as an economic minimum. 46 
Clearly, the egalitarian argument for democracy could also provide a normative standpoint to 
assess the limits of the Court’s ‘democratic society’. My point here is limited to showing that 
the Court’s understanding of freedom of expression is faithful to the cardinal value of public 
equality when it protects views that ‘offend, shock or disturb’ or when it holds that a 
‘democratic society’ requires people to receive plural and contradictory perspectives on an 
issue of public interest – thereby showing that the Court’s reasoning in fact relies upon 
democratic-procedural considerations. 
4. The rights, duties and duty-bearers required by the Court’s ‘democratic society’ 
Up to this point, my objective was to show that the Court’s ‘democratic society’ and 
ultimately the positive duty derived from pluralism finds support in democratic theory and, 
within the field, in the egalitarian argument for democracy. I concentrated on the right to 
freedom of expression (Article 10) and on the main definitional statements of the Court when 
it has to substantiate its normative notion of ‘democratic society’. In this section, I want to 
                                                 
42
  Ibid., 131. 
43
 Ibid., 264. 
44
 Thomas Christiano, ‘Authority,’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 
2013, 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/authority.(accessed January 15, 2015). 
45
 Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, 164. 
46
 As Christiano explains, ‘the first claim must be assessed against the background that the democratic and 
liberal rights are assured and that each has a basic minimum of material goods. If these latter conditions are 
satisfied, then it appears that the society is treating its members publicly as equals’. Ibid., 178. 
 11 
 
show how this approach can not only illuminate the Court’s identification of particular duties 
and duty-bearers correlative to that right but also show how it extends to peaceful assembly 
and association (Article 11) and to the right to free, fair and regular elections (Article 3 
Protocol 1). As explained above, all individuals must be equally informed on the issues that 
affect them all and equally informed on what others think on those issues. If one simply thinks 
that one can easily access the other’s thoughts on those issues, then one treats others unfairly 
in the context of deep pluralism. Let us start with more specific right-bearers under Article 10 
(expression). Most importantly, the Court cannot insist enough on the role of the press as 
‘public watchdog’ of its ‘democratic society’. Since this argument first appeared in Jersild v. 
Denmark, which concerned a TV interview of members of racist group in a Danish 
newspaper, the Court has been reinforcing the point: 
‘It is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and ideas of public 
interest. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and 
ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press 
would be unable to play its vital role of ‘public watchdog’. Although formulated 
primarily with regard to the print media, these principles doubtless apply also to 
the audio-visual media’.47 
The allocation of the margin of appreciation is the legal-structural implication of the Court’s 
attachment to democracy. If freedom of the press is the vehicle of an informed debate on 
issues of public interest, then the margin of appreciation left to states parties should be thin 
even when the finding of a violation involves significant costs on the other party (such as in 
the conflict with the right to reputation under Article 8). This is precisely the argument 
defended by the Court. As the Court makes clear in Editions Plon v. France, which concerned 
the publication of a book on the health of French president François Mitterrand, ‘the national 
margin of appreciation is circumscribed by the interests of a democratic society in enabling 
the press to exercise its vital role of ‘public watchdog’’.48 Note here that by ‘political’ or 
‘public’ issue, the Court can mean post-electoral comments such as in Lingens v. Austria49, 
the status of past political figures in Lehideux and Isorni v. France, the issue of doping in 
sport as in the recent Ressiot et autres c. France50 or the quality of public water in the recent 
Šabanović v Montenegro and Serbia.51 The core rationale is the same: if the press cannot 
inform the people about the nature of the public interest and offer plural views on it, one can 
neither limit one’s own bias on the ideas and actions that should constitute the public good, 
nor receive the guarantee that one is publicly treated an equal. The same line of reasoning 
extends to the actions of governments and political parties that the press may report (as well 
as NGOs, scientists, intellectuals, etc.).  
Here again, is there any limit to the press’ freedom? One limit is that, despite the need for 
exaggeration and provocation needed to realize a ‘democratic society’, there should be a 
significant distortion of facts. This is the case of Kania and Kittel v. Poland, in which two 
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Polish journalists published pictures of a car that a Polish minister supposedly received as a 
gift from a businessman: 
‘It is true that, when taking part in a public debate on a matter of general concern 
– like the applicants in the present case – an individual is allowed to have recourse 
to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation, or in other words to make 
somewhat immoderate statements (…). However, the Court considers that there is 
a difference between acceptable exaggeration or provocation, or somewhat 
immoderate statements, and the distortion of facts known to the journalists at the 
time of publication’.52 
The Court adopted the same argument in Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, 
which involved a series of criminal convictions related to the publication of a book on French 
politician and then-head of Front National party Jean-Marie Le Pen, implicating Le Pen’s 
responsibility in the party’s violent action. In this case, the Court held that the terms of 
‘executioner’ and ‘chief of a gang of killers’ exceeded the limits of the right to freedom of 
expression on empirical grounds.53 This is one of the only cases in which reputation 
outweighs expression. When the expression is about opinions and judgments (non-factual), 
the Court falls back on its democratic ethos. The expression of criticism, insult, exaggeration 
or satire is most justifiable when it concerns elected politicians and members of the 
government. This is best seen in the way the Court understands the conflict between Article 
10 and the right to reputation of politicians subject to criticism (under the right to private life 
in Article 8). In Oberschlik v. Austria (no 2), the applicant was convicted and ordered to pay a 
fine for having used the term ‘idiot’ in reaction to a speech of Austrian politician Jörg Haider. 
The Court held the following:  
‘as to the limits of acceptable criticism, they are wider with regard to a politician 
acting in his public capacity than in relation to a private individual. A politician 
inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word 
and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must display a greater 
degree of tolerance, especially when he himself makes public statements that are 
susceptible of criticism. He is certainly entitled to have his reputation protected, 
even when he is not acting in his private capacity, but the requirements of that 
protection have to be weighed against the interests of open discussion of political 
issues, since exceptions to freedom of expression must be interpreted narrowly’.54  
The same is true when private citizens publicly insult heads of states as in the recent Eon v. 
France.55 How does the egalitarian defense of democracy solve this conflict? Again, it 
suggests considering the costs of limiting each right in light of the quest for public equality. 
The head of state holds a crucial public role and stands at the core of how a society is 
organized. This position implies that what people think about that particular person should be 
constantly and equally debated, so that public equality can be equally advanced: ‘these public 
figures have a great influence on the public and represent certain ways of living or approaches 
to the organization of society or even styles of thinking. Thus they ought to that extent be 
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more open to attacks and the standard of libel that protects them ought to be more stringent, 
so that open and free discussion about the issues they raise can be advanced’.56  
Under Article 11 (reunion and association), one can take the Court’s understanding of the role 
of political parties and the conditions of their dissolution as another example. Since pluralism 
is at least as pervasive among individuals as among political parties, the sufficient condition 
for dissolving a party should be stringent. In United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. 
Turkey, in which the Turkish communist party was dissolved by Turkey’s constitutional court, 
the Court held that ‘there can be no justification for hindering a political group solely because 
it seeks to debate in public the situation of part of the State’s population and to take part in the 
nation’s political life in order to find, according to democratic rules, solutions capable of 
satisfying everyone concerned’.57 Even when it considered the public defense of Sharia law, 
the Court maintained its line of reasoning. For the egalitarian democrat, banning anti-
egalitarian views is a violation of the principle of public equality even if the anti-egalitarian 
does not adopt it: ‘there is no difficulty in treating people who are opposed to equality in 
accordance with the principle of public equality. And there is no difficulty in seeing that the 
banning of the expression of beliefs opposed to equality is a public violation of equality’.58  
Now, if the political party in question has a real chance to seize power and endanger the 
democratic process itself once in office (notably by not respecting pluralism59), the Court 
holds that it should be dissolved. This is where the democratic procedure is limited by the 
substantive values that justify the procedure in the first place. More broadly, any political 
party or group may promote an alternative ‘societal model’60 through constitutional changes 
conducted through democratic rules. The right to free elections (Article 3 (Protocol 1)) is here 
certainly implied. However, for a ruling party to implement elections and yet constrain 
pluralism would clearly fail to respect the standards of a ‘democratic society’. On that other 
count, the Court’s requirement of respecting the democratic procedure also implies 
substantive limits on the outcome of that procedure. But the normative basis is essentially the 
same: the respect for public equality in the context of deep pluralism. The interest in 
promoting public equality is an interest in exercising some rights to some extent. If the 
outcome of that procedure amounts to limiting that distribution, or to discriminate among 
groups or persons in the exercise of those rights, then this outcome is anti-democratic. For the 
egalitarian democrat, ‘the principle of public equality serves as a constraint on the 
advancement of the interests of the members of society’.61 The rights therefore operate as 
trumps against the utilitarian quest for the aggregated majoritarian good when such a quest 
harms the deontological principle of public equality.  
Finally, under the right to free and fair elections (Article 3 (Protocol 1)), the Court has made 
explicit that elections are inconceivable if the state party has failed to fulfill the positive duty 
associated with pluralism. On the egalitarian view, this is simply because voting on an issue 
of public interest without being informed of others’ views on an issue public interest is 
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suboptimal in terms of realizing public equality. The point has been recently reiterated in 
Şükran Aydın and Others v. Turkey, concerning a mayor having campaigned for 
parliamentary elections in Kurdish, where the Court held ‘that free elections are inconceivable 
without the free circulation of political opinions and information’.62 Of course, if it forms part 
of a conceptual continuum with Articles 10 and 11, the right to elections does not play the 
same practical role. Freedom of expression is prevalent in pre-electoral periods; in Bowman v. 
United Kingdom, for instance, the Court held that: 
‘for example, as the Court has observed in the past, freedom of expression is one 
of the ‘conditions’ necessary to ‘ensure the free expression of the opinion of the 
people in the choice of the legislature. For this reason, it is particularly important 
in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are 
permitted to circulate freely’.63  
As to the more specific duties correlative to the right to free elections, the Court is remarkably 
modest. It does not examine the constitutional arrangements of the state party in great detail. 
This modesty is clearly questionable under the egalitarian conception of democracy. The core 
duty established by the Court is that elections ‘must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern 
to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the 
will of the people through universal suffrage’.64 This implies, most importantly, the absence 
of pressure on the voters. As the Court held in the same Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, which 
pertained to the organization of parliamentary elections in Turkey, ‘the words ‘free expression 
of the opinion of the people’ mean that elections cannot be conducted under any form of 
pressure in the choice of one or more candidates, and that in this choice the elector must not 
be unduly induced to vote for one party or another’.65 In the same modest vein, the Court 
protects the effective representation of elected members (most notably, in the national 
parliament) and their duty to apply the commitments they made during the pre-election 
period. As the Court held in Ahmed and Others v. United Kingdom, which concerned the 
limits put to the involvement of local government officials in political activities, ‘members of 
the public also have a right to expect that the members whom they voted into office will 
discharge their mandate in accordance with the commitments they made during an electoral 
campaign and that the pursuit of that mandate will not flounder on the political opposition of 
their members’ own advisers’.66   
However, the Court does not require states parties to conform to a specific system of elections 
and representation and the type of ballot designed (proportional, majority, etc.) as long as the 
core duties outlined above are protected. As the Court held in the seminal Mathieu Mohin v. 
Belgium, which concerned various discriminations between Dutch-speaking and French-
speaking parliamentary members,  
‘article 3 (P1-3) provides only for ‘free’ elections ‘at reasonable intervals’, ‘by 
secret ballot’ and ‘under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the 
opinion of the people’. Subject to that, it does not create any ‘obligation to 
introduce a specific system’ (…) such as proportional representation or majority 
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voting with one or two ballots. Here too the Court recognises that the Contracting 
States have a wide margin of appreciation, given that their legislation on the 
matter varies from place to place and from time to time’.67  
A specific example of the Court’s restraint is that it does not protect the equality of 
opportunity for election:  
‘it does not follow, however, that all votes must necessarily have equal weight as 
regards the outcome of the election or that all candidates must have equal chances 
of victory. Thus no electoral system can eliminate ‘wasted votes’. For the 
purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-3), any electoral system must be 
assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned; features 
that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may accordingly be 
justified in the context of another, at least so long as the chosen system provides 
for conditions which will ensure the ‘free expression of the opinion of the people 
in the choice of the legislature’’.68  
This judicial restraint is clearly questionable if one adheres to the egalitarian democrat’s 
argument. Regulating the conditions for parties to run for election (e.g. campaign finance) is 
another crucial opportunity to preserve and promote public equality. This issue is crucial 
because among the conditions to run for election, political parties representing minorities may 
have significantly lower levels of financial resources and therefore lower capacities to make 
the views of minorities heard and debated – therefore influencing not only the outcome of 
elections, but also designing the agenda for discussion. As Christiano explains: ‘the views of 
the disadvantaged are likely to receive much less of a hearing in the democratic forum. As a 
consequence, there will be little opportunity to learn from the responses to these views’.69 The 
search for public equality remains the guiding value – both procedural and substantive.  
In this sense, the intermediate conclusion that needs to be drawn is that the Court is very 
attentive to considerations of democracy understood in procedural and substantive terms. 
What is more, I have shown that Court’s ‘democratic society’ plays a central normative role 
in justifying the very existence of the Convention rights, in fixing their scope or in balancing 
their weight against other rights. Further, I have argued that the egalitarian justification of 
democracy can best make normative sense of their scope and the various duties the Court has 
generated on its behalf, making public equality the implicit normative ideal of the Court 
(under the rights examined). Based on this investigation, there is enough to say that there is a 
conception of democracy underlying the Court’s reasoning.  
Before addressing rival accounts and possible objections to this argument, I want first to draw 
some implications for how the balancing conducted by the Court, more specifically, has been 
conventionally portrayed and criticized in the literature. This is another point on which the 
current literature seems rather limited. Indeed, the literature tends to reconstruct the balancing 
as a largely arbitrary determination between deontology (the rights derived from the status of 
right-holders) against utilitarianism (the public interest understood as the aggregated 
preferences of others, or the aggregated preferences of all the state parties). Since this conflict 
is ultimately between two mutually exclusive concepts of morality, one cannot find a standard 
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that would neatly strike the balance between them. Moreover, the Court remains silent on 
what exactly constitutes the public interest sufficient to override a right.70  
The combined effect is a strong skepticism towards the very idea of balancing. As Greer 
explains, ‘the central problem with the ‘balance model’ is that it suggests a weighing of rights 
and collective rights which does not only down-grades to interests, but requires judges – who 
are ill-equipped to decide what is in the public interest – constantly to defer to non-judicial 
determinations of how the balance between the two should be struck’.71 One proposal 
defended by Greer is that the Court should insist on applying a ‘priority-to-rights principle’ 
inherent to the Convention itself.72 This principle, in short, ‘systematically accords rights 
greater weight than collective goods’73 without however implying that rights should 
systematically trump public interests. Rather, ‘the Convention merely suggests that rights 
should be ‘prioritized’ or ‘privileged’ over collective goods in different ways according to the 
terms of the Convention’74 and ‘without the need for judges to refer directly to political 
morality at all’.75 This view clearly amounts to a principled renouncement of balancing.  
There is a point in favor of that strong skepticism towards balancing: the Court describes this 
step of the review in terms that invite it. In every case brought before it, the Court holds that it 
‘must look at the interference in the light of the case as a whole’, including ‘the content of the 
impugned statements’ and the ‘context in which they were made’. This apparent vagueness 
has lead scholars to argue that ‘the balancing between the various conflicting interests takes 
place ad hoc, in the absence of a normative theory. This has naturally appeared arbitrary, 
particularly in view of the general requirement that courts must justify their decisions’.76 This 
skepticism could go hand in hand with the democratic objection. 
Yet in light of my investigation on the ‘democratic society’ clause, and the justificatory role it 
plays for the rights examined, portraying the Court’s balancing in those skeptical terms seems 
just too quick. Greer’s ‘priority-to-rights’ principle presupposes that the wording of the rights 
should orient the balancing, whereas my interpretation of the reasoning suggests that it is the 
‘democratic society’ clause that not only helps the Court strike the balance but also define 
what those rights are about in the first place. Consequently, the reason why the public defense 
of Sharia law is permitted, for instance, should not have to do with some a priori stringency 
accorded to the freedom of expression. On my view, it is the deontological basis implicit in 
‘democratic society’ (the search for public equality) that explains that explains why the right-
holder prevails over the respondent state party.  
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Surely, I am not extending this point to all the claims the Court has held on all the qualified 
rights of the Convention. It has been clearly shown that when the Court screens the pan-
European practice to determine the appropriate level of protection of the rights under 
examination and fails to identify it, the respondent state party tends to override the applicant 
(through the margin of appreciation). More generally, ‘where the Court is unable to find the 
existence of a European consensus then it will tend to adopt a more literal interpretation of the 
Convention’.77 For instance, under Article 9 (freedom of thought and religion), the Court has 
not specified what it takes to be a sufficiently strong manifestation of a religious belief in 
question to be protected and invokes the lack of a pan-European standard.78 Yet the Court 
does not adopt this majoritarian approach when it finds a violation, which clearly introduces 
inconsistency in the methodology. There is also room for questioning how that judicial 
restraint fits into the ‘democratic society’ I have extracted.  
5. Addressing potential objections and rival views 
I hope to have now shown the extent to which the Court relies on a normative conception of 
‘democratic society’ to justify its interpretive authority vis-à-vis its subjects. This conception 
helps the Court justify the rights’ foundations, identify their correlative duties and duty-
bearers and balance rights against other rights or normative considerations. In this section, I 
draw the implications of my investigation for the on-going burning debate on the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court’s authority. Indeed, the argument that its supreme interpretive role 
cannot be reconciled with basic democratic-procedural standards is currently booming among 
legal and political theorists. Of course, democratic theorists have for long argued that 
domestic judicial review does not and cannot respect the representativeness that is required 
from democratic institutions domestically. Interestingly, the argument is today re-activated in 
the supranational context of UN Treaty Bodies and/or the Court. I concentrate here on two 
recent accounts, those of Steven Wheatley and Richard Bellamy. I present their core argument 
and then assess them in light of my investigation. Finally, I also explain how my view differs 
from Lestas’ ‘moral reading’ argument.  
Wheatley’s ‘self-government’ conception  
 
While accepting in principle the function of judicial review (to ‘develop the best interpretation 
of constitutional norms, including human rights norms, that can be justified in terms of the 
public concept of justice and public reason’79), Wheatley objects that the predominant 
methodology of IHRBs does not incorporate the ‘democratic’ discussion of human rights 
norms that has been developing within the states’ legal and political orders. Although 
Wheatley’s argument does not concentrate on the Strasbourg Court specifically, his argument 
fully applies to the European context, which is illustrated by the reference to seminal cases of 
the Court. The core objection is that unlike those of national courts, the judgments of the 
Strasbourg’s Court and the interpretive tools that support them do not have a deliberative 
forum to enhance their public justifiability. 
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Two core premises lead to Wheatley’s critical conclusion about the Court’s current practice. 
First, Wheatley rightly explains that state parties, in accordance with the principle of 
‘jurisdictional subsidiarity’80, may develop their own understanding of the content and scope 
of human rights through their internal democratic procedure, including in courts. State parties 
indeed remain the primary interpreters and the only enforcers of the Convention. However, 
the Court’s judicial methodology (the predominant doctrines of interpretation) tends not to 
take into account the outcome of that procedure: ‘the dynamic or teleological approach to 
interpretation has led IHRBs to construe human rights norms in a way that is not consistent 
with the sovereign political wills of State parties reflected in the adoption of the international 
law instrument and their accession to the regime’.81  
Second, Wheatley assumes that democracy – more specifically, a ‘self-government’ 
conception of democracy – is a response to the facts of pluralism and disagreement imposing 
requirements on the conduct of political deliberation:  
‘the importance of a self-government conception of democracy is confirmed by 
the facts of reasonable disagreement and imperfect knowledge in political 
discussions; the importance of private autonomy and public participation for the 
individual citizen; the requirement for (at least hypothetical) consent for the 
exercise of political authority; and the need for members of a political community 
to commit themselves to a process of collective decision-making that takes into 
account the interests of others within the community’.82 
As we have seen, Christiano’s egalitarian argument relies on the same premises. However, 
Wheatley’s response to the fact of reasonable disagreement and cognitive bias differs. He 
adopts a Rawlsian and Habermasian position in that democracy should still strive, through 
deliberation, to attain the assent of the all affected subjects, whether the norms in question 
originate at the national or international level (as with human rights treaties). Adopting this 
criterion has implications for the legitimate function of judicial review, whether national or 
international: ‘the function of judicial review is to develop the best interpretation of 
constitutional norms, including human rights norms, that can be justified in terms of the 
public concept of justice and public reason, based on the relevant body of constitutional 
materials and precedents’.83 This is how Wheatley understands the ‘political conception’ of 
human rights: ‘an act of political will formation’.84  
However, the question of how exactly one should manage disagreement is peripheral to the 
main challenge that Wheatley poses to the Court’s predominant methodology. The core of the 
argument is minimally procedural: while human rights norms are debated within the domestic 
                                                 
80
 This term t is owed to Samantha Besson. ‘Jurisdictional subsidiarity’ is one dimension of subsidiarity in the 
context of the Court. In addition, ‘interpretive subsidiarity’ refers to the allocation of the margin of appreciation 
and ‘remedial subsidiarity’ to the freedom left to state party to choose how to execute its conventional 
obligations. Finally, ‘remedial subsidiarity’ refers to the freedom left to states to choose how to execute their 
conventional obligations. See in particular Samantha Besson, ‘European Human Rights, Supranational Judicial 
Review and Democracy - Thinking Outside the Judicial Box,’ in Patricia Poepelier, Catherine Van de Heyning, 
and Piet Van Nuffel (eds.), Human Rights Protection in the European Legal Orders: Interaction Between 
European Courts and National Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
81
 Wheatley, ‘On the Legitimate Authority of International Human Rights Bodies,’ 100. 
82
 Ibid, 105. 
83
 Ibid, 106. 
84
 Ibid, 104. 
 19 
 
legal and political sphere like other public norms, the judicial methodology of the Court to 
resolve cases is not: ‘the problem lies in the seeming absence of any parallel political 
discourses, in contrast to the position within the State, as international human rights law 
regimes do not provide a formal public space for political deliberation’.85 Given this basic 
democratic-procedural desideratum, Wheatley argues that the Court should be responsive to 
the democratic specification of those rights by national courts: ‘the function of IHRBs is not 
to give expression to moral rights, i.e. inherent rights we possess simply by virtue of ‘being 
human’, but to give expression to the overlapping consensus of the subjects of the regime on 
the issue of human rights’.86 There is no way in which the Court can ‘know better’ about the 
content and scope of the Convention rights: ‘the political culture of the democratic States, i.e. 
the way in which political debate is conducted within democratic society, is not sympathetic 
to any claim to ‘know better’ by an actor or institution on issues of social, economic and 
political controversy, i.e. where there is disagreement (…)’.87  
Bellamy’s defense of weak review 
As explained above, Wheatley constructs a normative(-Rawlsian) account of the Court’s 
interpretive methodology but does not question the Court’s established function. In contrast, 
Bellamy’s account aims to restrict the Court’s very function to a form of weak review. While 
Wheatley starts from the current practice of IHRBs (e.g. the Court’s predominant 
methodology) and then asks how those could be granted legitimate authority, Bellamy 
proceeds by re-casting his framework of political constitutionalism and then assesses the 
extent to which it is compatible with the judicial powers conferred to the Court. 
Therefore, to understand Bellamy’s case for weak review is to understand the core of the case 
for political constitutionalism. As for Wheatley (and Christiano), Bellamy assumes that judges 
as individuals are cognitively biased and may reasonably disagree over the content and scope 
of rights. But Bellamy draws a distinctive implication pertaining to the allocation of political 
authority when there is disagreement: ‘to the extent that these judicial disagreements reflect 
difference of opinion among the population as a whole, their resolution should ultimately rest 
with legislatures that are elected and decide themselves on the basis of majority rule’.88 This 
is because the resolution of disagreement is more democratic when it applies to the whole 
population (or at least their parliamentary representatives) – it better respects ‘the need for 
equal consideration of the views and interests of citizens’.89 This entails that the 
parliamentary scrutiny of rights should be prioritized over judicial scrutiny. Bellamy’s case 
therefore converges with Wheatley and Christiano about the possibility of reasonable 
disagreement about the content and scope of rights, on the one hand, and about the need to 
equally address the interests of all subjects in the democratic process, on the other. Yet 
Bellamy’s fundamental skepticism towards the entrenchment of rights (‘the procedural-
substantive distinction proves impossible to maintain’90) demarcates political 
constitutionalism from both Wheatley’s Rawlsian framework and from Christiano’s 
egalitarian argument for democracy. I come back to this crucial point below. 
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This leads to reforming the process of supranational human rights review in at least two 
respects that matter for our endeavors. First, only basic rights ought to be subject to the 
Court’s scrutiny:  
‘contestation ought to be limited to cases where domestic political and judicial 
avenues have been exhausted and only those rights that are considered basic to 
each citizens within a given polity being able to publicly advance their interests 
on equal terms with others (…)’.91 
Bellamy however neither identifies those rights nor explains how the Court should conduct its 
review. Second, the priority assigned to parliamentary sovereignty entails that ‘the possibility 
of overriding an IHRCt judgement must also exist, with such decisions resting with a 
consensus among the representatives of the democratic governments, who should be 
ultimately charged with monitoring state compliance with the Court’s ruling’.92 Article 46 is 
here targeted. However, the fact the Court cannot strike down domestic laws – its role is 
simply declaratory – leads Bellamy to conclude that the Court ‘could be described as 
applying a ‘soft version’ of strong review’.93 One may add here that state parties also benefit 
from ‘remedial subsidiarity’94 – that is, they can choose how to respond to the Court’s 
judgement.  
Assessing objections and rival views 
Wheatley and Bellamy’s accounts are relevant to my own investigation because they assume 
the central premise of the egalitarian argument for democracy, namely disagreement and 
cognitive bias in collective deliberation. Further, they both assume that the very legitimacy of 
the democratic procedure depends on equally addressing the interests of all subjects in that 
discussion. They therefore overlap in acknowledging that the Court’s protection of some basic 
rights is necessary to the procedure if domestic legal and political systems fail to do so. The 
two accounts however diverge, as we have seen, in their critique of the Court’s authority – 
Wheatley’s focuses on the method for deriving the content adduced to the rights while 
Bellamy’s extends to the Court’s basic function. But one may wonder if one missing step of 
their investigation is a more careful reconstruction of the Court’s case law – especially if both 
accord (some limited) legitimacy to the Court’s function.  
Indeed, both authors do not investigate the Court’s case law in great detail and thereby fail to 
assess if, how, and to what extent the Court may justify its interpretive authority on the 
democratic considerations they take as central to their own normative accounts. True, they 
refer to seminal or famous cases of the Court (Wheatley and Bellamy), mention the margin of 
appreciation (Wheatley and Bellamy) or the predominant doctrines of the Court (Wheatley). 
But there is no systematic examination of the predominant reasons given by the Court to 
ground, extend, restrict or balance rights. Nor do they differentiate between rights. This is 
surprising because the Court’s adjudication is ad hoc and right-based. Moreover, if they 
mention the margin of appreciation, they fail to explain to which rights the device applies and 
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for what reasons. Bellamy praises the device95 but does not reconstruct where and to what 
rights it applies. Wheatley in turn mentions the margin of appreciation only in a footnote.96 
This is surprising because the breadth of the Court’s adjudication is supposed to justify his 
‘democratic’ objection in the first place. Further, pointing to the Court’s teleological approach 
then constructing a normative account of judicial review should lead to the question whether 
and how the Court applies that same doctrine to Court’s ‘democratic society’ given the 
governing role the notion plays in the reasoning.   
My legal-empirical inquiry on the Court’s ‘democratic society’ shows that, as far as Articles 
8-11 are concerned, the Court justifies its interpretive authority by asserting the basic 
procedural and substantive criteria of democratic legitimacy that those authors employ to 
examine and question the Court’s authority. It must be recalled, however, that my adoption of 
Christiano’s egalitarian argument is sufficient to emphasize specific rights, duties and duty-
bearers that serve the equal advancement of interests in the democratic process – a list that 
Bellamy’s view, given its rejection of the procedural-substantive distinction, may be at pain 
with (although his view partly relies on Christiano’s). This being said, Bellamy does allow 
judicial scrutiny for those rights considered ‘basic to each citizens within a given polity being 
able to publicly advance their interests on equal terms with others (…)’.97 If one takes 
Christiano’s emphasis on freedom of expression as one of those basic rights, then one can 
conclude that the Court’s ‘democratic society’ (the derived duties and duty-bearers) coheres 
with the egalitarian argument and therefore that the Court reinforces the democratic process in 
state parties rather than interferes with it. This is also valid for how the Court arbitrates 
conflicts of rights and for how it allocates the margin of appreciation, as we have seen.  
Now, does the Court’s substantive conception of ‘democratic society’ lead to adopting what 
George Letsas has termed a ‘moral reading’ of the Convention’s rights? In a notable article, 
Letsas argues that ‘the Court’s interpretive ethic became one of looking at the substance of the 
human right as issue and the moral value it serves in a democratic society, rather than 
engaging in linguistic exercises about the meaning of words or empirical searches about the 
intentions of the drafters’.98 Like Weatley, Letsas concentrates on the range of interpretive 
doctrines that the Court has created and developed and that dismiss conventional doctrines of 
adjudication (e.g. literalism, originalism, intentionalism, consensualism, etc.). My 
reconstruction of the Court’s ‘democratic society’ nuances this view on two important points. 
First, while it is correct that the Court captures the normative role of those rights in a 
‘democratic society’, the same point does not apply to all the Convention’s rights – in 
particular, those on which the Court has tended to accord a wide margin of appreciation. As 
we have briefly seen, the Court has not specified what it takes to be a sufficiently strong 
manifestation of a religious belief (under Article 9 (freedom of thought and religion)) 
regularly invokes the lack of a pan-European standard. Letsas does not specify which rights 
(and which duties and duty-bearers) the moral reading is concerned and what reasons the 
Court gives for it.  
Second, Letsas does not only hold that the Court has adopted a moral reading of rights. He 
also argues that the Court’s very purpose is ‘to discover, over time and through persuasive 
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moral argument, the moral truth about these fundamental rights’.99 Now, Letsas convincingly 
shows that the Court has progressively dismissed a range of positivist doctrines of 
adjudication. But that finding alone does not necessarily imply that the Court is searching and 
discovering the moral truths of rights.100 My inquiry on the governing role of the Court’s 
‘democratic society’ reveals that the Court’s substantive reasoning centers on the public 
equality of individuals in a political community. This premise is certainly deontological in 
kind. Yet deontological statements are not necessarily moral truths. This is because the 
concept of moral truth implies – if taken seriously – reporting independent facts (in light of 
which moral statements are true or false).101 But nothing in the text of the Court’s judgments 
demonstrates that the Court reports facts of that kind. In fact, judges could agree on the 
deontological premise of public equality while diverging about the ultimate moral foundations 
of that status. In a more recent contribution focused on the Court’s evolutive doctrine of 
interpretation, Letsas further suggests that  
‘The Convention is meant to protect whatever human rights people in fact 
have, and not what human rights domestic authorities or public opinion think 
people have. As a result, a better understanding of the nature of human rights 
and the principles that justify them will require an evolving interpretation of 
the Convention’.102 
Here again, one can admit that anti-majoritarianism is a core structural feature of rights 
(human or just individual). One may then imply that such feature dismisses, in principle, 
methods of adjudication based on utilitarian or majoritarian considerations (in one or between 
state parties to the CoE). But one may here again wonder if anti-majoritarianism per se 
implies that the Court’s reasoning amounts to finding moral truths. Moreover, my point does 
not limit the Court’s deontological reasoning when it reviews cases and develops its case law. 
Rather than a quest for moral truths, the Court searches for the duties (e.g. the Court’s positive 
duty of providing ‘plural perspective’) and duty-bearers (e.g the press, political parties, 
scientists and intellectuals, etc.) that serve the realization of this basic equality in the 
conditions of deep pluralism.  
6. Conclusion 
I started this article by noticing the radical shift of perspective on the place of democracy in 
the political discourse surrounding the Court. While this fact is often neglected, democracy 
initially constituted the impetus towards the establishment of an ‘alarm bell’ mechanism 
against the return of totalitarianism. Today, in contrast, democracy is increasingly employed 
as normative standpoint to assess its Court’s ‘democratic’ performance. This exercise is 
legitimate simply because the domestic institutions support the ideal of democracy, human 
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rights and the rule of law have significantly developed within state parties over the last 
decades. The adoption of human rights treaties, the translation of those norms into domestic 
legal orders (by legislative act or direct effect) and their integration in public deliberation 
count among those developments. The normative theory of democracy has also developed and 
offers conceptual and normative resources to address the foundations and limits of rights. In 
those conditions, how can the Court’s adjudication can be reconciled with the democratic-
procedural standards by which state parties decide about the content and scope of human 
rights norms has become a vexing question. 
 
In this article, I tried to add a layer of considerations to this on-going debate that can offer a 
new perspective on the Court’s ‘democratic performance’. More precisely, I suggested 
revisiting our understanding of the Court’s interpretive role by investigating its ‘democratic 
society’. This implied, first, capturing its location in the review, its crucial role in finding a 
violation and the range of rights that it governs. I hope to have shown that the Court’s 
‘democratic society’ has become the normative grounding of the Convention’s political rights. 
The positive duty of pluralism, more precisely, is the connecting thread in the case law. 
Pluralism operates not only in the grounding of right, but also helps the Court identifying 
prominent duties and duty-bearers such as the press in the case of Article 10. Because the 
Convention is a brief, abstract and indeterminate document, it is unlikely that one can 
reconstruct the breadth of ‘democratic society’ irrespective of the specific cases in which 
deployed. This is why I addressed Article 10, Article 11 and Article 3 (Protocol 1) separately 
before reconstructing their underlying relations. This step is my view necessary to render 
justice to the development of the Court’s case law. 
 
Second, I explained how the Court’s ‘democratic society’ can be supported be the egalitarian 
argument in democratic theory. In short, the Court’s insistence on protecting divisive views 
and promoting contradictory debates helps fostering the egalitarian conditions of the 
democratic procedure. The search for public equality is not only procedural but also 
substantive. As exemplified in conflicts of rights, the Court interferes is justified when state 
parties ‘democratically’ violate public equality. Obviously, my analysis is confined to the 
predominant reasoning of the Court on the ‘qualified rights’ of the Convention and does not 
incorporate other provisions. However, the restriction clauses imply that the Court enjoys 
more interpretive freedom on those rights than others – the same freedom that raises the 
legitimacy question. Therefore, I believe that how the Court has specified their content should 
be carefully addressed in reflecting on its normative legitimacy vis-à-vis state parties. 
 
Finally, I showed what my investigation can change to current debate on the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court’s authority. The implications are significant. I showed that the Court’s 
critics adopt a normative framework – Wheatley’s self-government conception of democracy 
and Bellamy’s political constitutionalism – whose basic and central tenets are actually 
invoked and developed by the Court in exercising its interpretive authority. This lead me to 
the conclusion that rather than interfering with the democratic process in state parties, the 
Court’s authoritative role amounts to reinforcing and consolidating that same process.  
 
 
 
 
 
